Abstract-Society relies heavily on its networked physical infrastructure and information systems. Accurately assessing the vulnerability of these systems against disruptive events is vital for planning and risk management. Existing approaches to vulnerability assessments of large-scale systems mainly focus on investigating inhomogeneous properties of the underlying graph elements. These measures and the associated heuristic solutions are limited in evaluating the vulnerability of large-scale network topologies. Furthermore, these approaches often fail to provide performance guarantees of the proposed solutions. In this paper, we propose a vulnerability measure, pairwise connectivity, and use it to formulate network vulnerability assessment as a graph-theoretical optimization problem, referred to as -disruptor. The objective is to identify the minimum set of critical network elements, namely nodes and edges, whose removal results in a specific degradation of the network global pairwise connectivity. We prove the NP-completeness and inapproximability of this problem and propose an (log log log ) pseudo-approximation algorithm to computing the set of critical nodes and an (log 1 5 ) pseudo-approximation algorithm for computing the set of critical edges. The results of an extensive simulation-based experiment show the feasibility of our proposed vulnerability assessment framework and the efficiency of the proposed approximation algorithms in comparison to other approaches.
assess network vulnerability to disruptive events in order to protect network elements 1 against natural disasters and malicious human acts and mitigate the impact of such acts on network performance and survivability.
Over the last few years, a considerable amount of research effort has focused on developing approaches and methods to assess network vulnerability to disruptive events [1] . Central to these research studies is the use of graph-theoretic measures to determine how vital a network element is to the survivability of the network when faced with disruptive events. A number of these studies proposed global graph measures, such as cyclomatic number, maximum network circuits, -index, -index, and -index, as a single index to capture the network structure. The global index, derived from the basic properties of the graph-namely the number of vertices, edges, and pairwise shortest paths-is then used to assess and compare the vulnerability of different networks. Although relatively straightforward to calculate, global measures can neither be rigorously mapped to over the network connectivity nor reveal the set of most critical vertices and edges. Such a shortcoming considerably limits their suitability for assessing network vulnerability. Other research studies proposed local nodal centrality [7] , such as degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality, as a local network measure for network vulnerability. These local measures, which emphasize the relative topological characteristics of individual edges and nodes within a network, are used to identify and quantify critical network elements of the network, and evaluate network vulnerability. Unfortunately, the inability of local network measures to capture global network connectivity raises concerns about their validity to accurately assess network vulnerability and reveal the global damage that may be inflicted on the network when subjected to failures and attacks.
In this paper, we propose a new framework for accurately assessing network vulnerability. The basic tenet of our approach is to model the network as a connected directed graph and explore the number of necessary disruptive events, in terms of connectivity failures between pairs of nodes, that can cause a specific level of network disruption. To this end, we quantify the connectivity of each node pair as 1 if the pair is strongly connected, and as 0 otherwise. The pairwise connectivity quantification is then used to determine the minimized set of network elements whose removal from the graph incurs a specific level of network disruption. It is worth noting that the pairwise connectivity measure correlates with the number of network elements to be re- moved for the network to incur a level of disruption. As such, the measure can be used not only to assess the vulnerability of the network against disruptive events, but equally important to evaluate the global damage different levels of disruptive events may cause.
Based on the concept of pairwise connectivity, network vulnerability assessment can be formulated as a graph-theoretical optimization problem: Find a minimized set of network elements whose removal causes a specific level of network pairwise degradation. The minimized set of network elements is thereafter referred to as -disruptor, where denotes the fraction of pairwise connectivity degradation that is caused by the failure of the minimized set elements. Two new optimization problems, namely -vertex disruptor and -edge disruptor, are introduced and proved to be NP-complete. We also propose two pseudo-approximation algorithms, with provable performance bounds, to these optimization problems, thereby ensuring the feasibility of the proposed network vulnerability assessment framework.
The advantage of the -disruptor based framework, in comparison to node-centrality-based frameworks, can be briefly illustrated using Fig. 1 , where two strongly connected networks, and , with seven vertices each, are depicted. Using node degree centrality as a vulnerability measure reveals that removing the black vertex with maximum outgoing degree 5 in Fig. 1(a) leaves the network still strongly connected with five vertices, whereas removing the black vertex with maximum outgoing degree 4 in Fig. 1(b) partitions the graph into two strongly connected components. Therefore, the node-centrality-based assessment leads to the conclusion that is less vulnerable than . The analysis of the network vulnerability based on the proposed framework, however, shows that deleting only the gray vertex in is sufficient to decrease the overall network connectivity to 0. Furthermore, the analysis shows that at least three vertices in must be removed to reduce the overall connectivity of the network to 0. It is clear, therefore, that the -disruptor framework leads to the more accurate conclusion that network is in fact more vulnerable than network .
Another aspect of the proposed framework is the ability to explore different levels of disruption (different values of ), which can be used to gain deeper insight into network structure and robustness in various operating environments. Several recent studies in the context of wireless networks have focused on the impact of node and edge removal on network connectivity [8] - [10] . It is worth noting that most of these studies are not concerned with quantifying the level of network disconnectivity, a weaker objective than that of the -disruptor framework. We argue that quantifying network connectivity is essential to assessing network vulnerability to disruptive events and evaluate the level of fragmentation these events may inflict on the network. A scale-free network, for example, can tolerate high random failure rates, as the failure of boundary vertices may not significantly reduce the network connectivity even though the entire graph becomes disconnected [11] . Furthermore, different disruption levels may be caused by different network elements. The node-centrality-based vulnerability assessment framework, for example, only identifies a set of nodes with nonincreasing degrees with no consideration of the disruption level the removal of these sets of nodes may cause. The ability to quantify the disconnectivity level, a unique feature of -disruptor framework, is valuable in accurately assessing network vulnerability to disruptive events and predicting the impact of these events on network operations.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• A novel, pairwise-connectivity-centric framework for investigating vulnerability assessment as an optimization problem, referred to as -disruptor, on general graphs. Two versions of the problem, namely -vertex disruptor and -edge disruptor, are considered.
• A proof of the NP-completeness of the two versions of the -disruptor problem, including the proof that no polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) exists for -vertex disruptor.
• An pseudo-approximation algorithm for -vertex disruptor and an pseudo-approximation algorithm for -edge disruptor. These algorithms can be applied to both homogeneous networks and heterogeneous networks with unidirectional links and nonuniform nodal properties.
A. Model and Definitions
Besides the homogeneous network model consisting of uniform nodes and bidirectional links, the heterogeneous network model, where various interacting elements of different kinds are connected through unidirectional links with nonuniform expenses, finds numerous applications nowadays [12] - [14] , but as well, exhibits multiple difficulties for optimization and maintenance. In the light of this, we abstract our general network model as a directed graph , where refers to a set of nodes and refers to a set of unidirectional links. The expense of each directed edge between vertex and is quantified as a nonnegative value , for all the links among nodes. As mentioned above, our evaluation over the network vulnerability is based on the value of overall pairwise connectivity in the abstracted graph, which is defined as follows: Given any vertex pair in the graph, we say that they are connected iff there exists paths between and in both directions in , i.e., strongly connected to each other. The pairwise connectivity is quantified as 1 if this pair is connected, 0 otherwise. Since the main purpose of network lies in connecting all the interacting elements, we study the aggregate pairwise connectivity between all pairs, that is, the sum of quantified pairwise connectivity, which we denote as for graph . Apparently, is maximized at when is a strongly connected graph. Based on this, we have the following definition.
Definition 1: (Edge disruptor) Given
, a subset in is a -edge disruptor if the overall pairwise connectivity in the , obtained by removing from , is no more than . By minimizing the cost of such edges in , we have the -edge disruptor problem, i.e., find a minimized -edge disruptor in a strongly connected graph . Similarly, we define -Vertex disruptor and its corresponding optimization problem.
-vertex Disruptor Problem: Given a strongly connected graph and a fixed number , find a subset with the minimum size such that the total pairwise connectivity in , obtained by removing from , is no more than . Such a set is called -vertex disruptor.
B. Related Work
Several research efforts have sought to address network vulnerability assessment using local network measures focused on the centrality of a vertex in the graph, including degree centrality, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality [7] . While these metrics can provide some insight into network vulnerability, they are typically not accurate and in most cases fail to reveal the level of network disruption for different levels of attacks. Global graph measures have also been proposed to assess network vulnerability. These measures are mainly functions of graph properties, such as the number of vertices and edges, operational O-D pairs, operational paths, and minimum shortest paths [1] - [3] . Although useful in comparing different networks, the graph attributes, in some cases, cannot be calculated in polynomial-time for dense networks. Furthermore, the functions do not reveal the set of most critical vertices and edges in the network. As such, they may not be suitable to assess the network vulnerability in terms of connectivity.
Several research studies, using concepts similar to our pairwise connectivity, have been recently investigated in [15] - [17] , including average pairwise connectivity, pairwise connected ratio, and cohesion. None of these studies, however, formulates network vulnerability as an optimization problem. Using an optimization-based approach to network vulnerability enables a framework, where the hardness of the problem can be characterized and approximation algorithms with performance guarantees can be derived. Moreover, the problem -disruptor studied in this paper takes into account the roles of all edges and vertices in the global network connectivity, thereby providing the basis for a thorough analysis of the proposed vulnerability framework.
Finally, a number of research studies focused on a subproblem of the vulnerability assessment problem, namely the Critical Vertex/Edge, where the main objective is to determine the minimum number of vertices/edges whose removal disconnects the graph. Several heuristics were proposed to address this problem, including in the context of wireless networks [8] - [10] . The proposed heuristics, however, do not provide performance guarantees. Furthermore, the research studies in wireless environments focus on what elements of the graph cause the network to be disconnected, with no useful insight into the level of fragmentation caused by disruptive events of different scale and impact. As such, these approaches are limited in assessing network vulnerability accurately.
II. HARDNESS RESULTS
In this section, we show that both the -edge disruptor and -vertex disruptor in directed graph are NP-complete, which thus have no polynomial time exact algorithms unless . We state a stronger result that both problems are NP-complete even in undirected graph with unit cost edges.
Note that only in this section we consider the problem for undirected graph . All results in other sections are studied on directed graphs, thus solving both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks.
A. NP-Completeness of -Edge Disruptor
We use a reduction from the balanced cut problem. Definition 2: A cut corresponding to a subset in is the set of edges with exactly one endpoint in . The cost of a cut is the sum of its edges' costs (or simply its cardinality in the case all edges have unit costs). We often denote by . Finding a min cut in the graph is polynomial solvable [18] . However, if one asks for a somewhat "balanced" cut of minimum size, the problem becomes intractable. A balanced cut is defined as the following.
Definition 3: (Balanced cut) An -balanced cut of a graph , where , asks us to find a cut with the minimum size such that . Abusing notations, for , we also use -balanced cut to find the cut with the minimum size such that . We will use the following results on balanced cut shown in [19] .
Corollary 1: (Monotony) Let be a function with
Then, for all implies -balanced cut is polynomially reducible to -balanced cut.
Corollary 2: (Upper bound) -balanced cut is NP-complete for . It follows from Corollaries 1 and 2 that for every , -balanced cut is NP-complete. We are ready to prove the NP-completeness of -edge disruptor.
Theorem 1: ( -edge disruptor NP-completeness) -edge disruptor in undirected graph is NP-complete even if all edges have unit weights.
Proof: We prove the result for the special case when . For other values of , the proof can go through with a slight modification of the reduction. We shall assume that , the number of nodes, is a sufficient large number (for our proof, ). Consider the decision version of the problem has a -edge disruptor of size To show that -ED is in NP-complete, we must show that it is in NP and that all NP-problems are polynomial-time reducible to it. The first part is easy: Given a candidate subset of edges, we can easily check in polynomial time if it is a -edge disruptor of size . To prove the second part, we show that -balanced cut is polynomial-time reducible to -ED, where . Let be a graph in which one seeks to find an -balanced cut of size . Construct the following graph : n where are two cliques of size . Denote by the total number of nodes in . In addition to edges in , and , connect each vertex to vertices in and vertices in so that degree difference of nodes in the cliques is at most one. We illustrate the construction of in Fig. 2 . We show that there is an -balanced cut of size in iff has an -edge disruptor of size , where . Note that the cost of any cut in is at most . On one hand, an -balanced cut of size in induces a cut with size exactly . If we select the cut as the disruptor, the pairwise connectivity will be at most . On the other hand, assume that has an -edge disruptor of size . Remove the edges in the disruptor to reduce the pairwise connectivity to at most . Since cutting nodes in or from the cliques requires removing at least edges, let and be giant connected subsets that induce connected subgraphs in and . These subsets must satisfy . Denote by the subsets of nodes in that are connected to and , respectively. We have , otherwise and will be connected. Then, the pairwise connectivity will exceed . We will modify the disruptor without increasing its size and the pairwise connectivity such that no nodes in the cliques are cut off, i.e., we alter the disruptor until and . For each , remove from the disruptor all edges connecting to and add to the disruptor all edges connecting to . This will attach to while reducing the size of the disruptor at least . At the same time, select an arbitrary node and add to the disruptor all remaining 's adjacent edges. This increases the size of the disruptor at most while making isolated. By doing so, we decrease the size of the disruptor by . In addition, the pairwise connectivity will not increase as we connect to and at the same time disconnect from .
If
, we can select as in that case that makes sure the pairwise connectivity will not increase. We repeat the same process for every node in . Since , the whole process finishes in less than steps and results in and . We will prove that , i.e., induces a cut in . Assume not the cost to separate from will be at least that is a contradiction.
Since , we have that the disruptor induces a cut in . To have the pairwise connectivity at most , both and must have size at least . It follows that and must have size at least . The cost of the cut induced by in will be .
B. Hardness of -Vertex Disruptor
Theorem 2: -vertex disruptor in undirected graph is NP-complete.
Proof: We present a polynomial-time reduction from Vertex Cover (VC), an NP-hard problem [20] :
Instance: Given a graph and a positive integer . Question: Does have a VC of size at most to a decision version of -vertex disruptor when ? Instance: Given a graph and a positive integer . Question: Does have a -vertex disruptor of size at most when ? Pairwise connectivity equals zeros if and only if the complement set of the disruptor is an independent set or, in other words, the disruptor must be a VC.
Theorem 3: Unless -vertex disruptor cannot be approximated within a factor of 1.36.
Proof: We use the same reduction in Theorem 2. Assume that we can approximate -vertex disruptor within a factor less than 1.36 when . In [21] , Dinur and Safra showed that approximating VC within constant factor less than 1.36 is NP-hard. Since we have a one-to-one mapping between the set of vertex disruptors when and the set of VCs, it follows that we can approximate VC within a factor less than 1.36 (contradiction).
III. APPROXIMATING -EDGE DISRUPTOR USING TREE DECOMPOSITION
In this section, we present an pseudo-approximation algorithm for the -edge disruptor problem in the case when all edges have uniform cost, i.e., . Formally, our algorithm finds in a uniform directed graph a -edge disruptor whose cost is at most -, where and -is the cost of an optimal -edge disruptor. As shown in Algorithm 1, the proposal algorithm consists of two main steps. First, we construct a decomposition tree of by recursively partitioning the graph into two halves with directed -balanced cut. Second, we solve the problem on the obtained tree using a dynamic programming algorithm and transfer this solution to the original graph. These two main steps are explained in Sections III-A and III-B.
A. Balanced Tree-Decomposition
A tree decomposition of a graph is a recursive partitioning of the node set into smaller and smaller pieces until each piece contains only one single node. We show the tree construction in Algorithm 1 (lines 1-11). Our decomposition tree is a rooted binary tree whose leaves represent nodes in .
Definition 4: Given a directed graph and a subset of vertices . We denote the set of edges outgoing from by , and the set of edges incoming to by . A cut in is defined as . A -balanced cut is a cut s.t. . The directed -balanced cut problem is to find the minimum -balanced cut.
Note that a cut separates pairs as paths from to cannot exist, i.e., no SCC can contain a vertex in both and . The decomposition procedure is as follows. We start with the tree containing only one root node . We associate the root node with the vertex set of , i.e., . For each node whose contains more than one vertex and has not been partitioned, we partition the subgraph induced by in using a -balanced cut algorithm. In detail, we use the directed -balanced cut algorithm presented in [22] that finds in polynomial time a -balanced cut within a factor of from the optimal -balanced cut for and fixed constant . The constant is chosen to be . Create two child nodes of in corresponding to two sets of vertices of separated by the cut. We associate with a cut cost equal to the cost of the -balanced cut. We define the root node to be on level 1. If a node is on level , all its children are defined to be on level . Note that collections of subsets of vertices in that correspond to nodes in a same level of induce a partition in .
One important parameter of the decomposition tree is the height, i.e., the maximum level of nodes in . Using balanced cuts guarantees a small height of the tree that in turn leads to a small approximation ratio. When separating using the balanced cut, the size of the larger part is at most . Hence, we can prove by induction that if a node is on level , the size of the corresponding collection is at most . It follows that the tree's height is at most .
B. Algorithm
In this section, we present the second main step, which uses the dynamic programming to search for the right set of nodes in that induces an cost-efficient partition in whose pairwise connectivity is at most . Fig. 3 , we show a decomposition tree with a -partitionable set . The corresponding partition in can be obtained by cutting successively using balanced cuts in the tree construction. The cut cost, hence, will be . In general, the total cost of all the cuts to separate will be . The pairwise connectivity of is then . We wish to find so that , i.e., the union of cuts to separate forms a -edge disruptor in . Because of the suboptimal structure in , finding such a -partitionable subset in with the minimum can be done in using dynamic programming. Denote by the minimum cut cost to make the pairwise connectivity in equal to using only cuts corresponding to nodes in the subtree rooted at . The minimum cost Fig. 3 . Part of a decomposition tree. F = ft ; t ; t ; t g is G-partitionable. The corresponding partition fV (t );V (t );V (t );V (t )g in G can be obtained by using cuts at ancestors of nodes in F , i.e., t ; t ; t .
Algorithm 2:
Find a good -partitionable subset of that induces a -edge disruptor in Initialization:
; Preorder-Selection . Preorder-Selection 1: if then 2: 3: else let be children of , 4:
Preorder-Selection 5:
Preorder-Selection 6: end if for a -partitionable subset that induces a -edge disruptor of is then , where is the root node in .
We can easily derive the recursive formula if if not where are children of . In the first case, when , we cut no edges in , hence
. Otherwise, we try all possible combinations of pairwise connectivity in and in . The combination with the smallest cut cost is then selected.
We now prove that -, where -denotes the cost of the optimal -edge disruptor in . Lemma 1: There exists a -partitionable subset of that induces a -edge disruptor whose cost is at most -. Proof: Let be an optimal -edge disruptor in of size -and be the set of SCCs, after removing from . We construct a -partitionable subset as in Algorithm 2. We traverse tree in preorder, i.e., every parent will be visited before their children. For each node , we select into if there exists some component that and no ancestors of have been selected into . Since there exists a -partitionable subset of that induces a -edge disruptor whose cost is no more than -as shown in Lemma 1 and the dynamic programming always finds the best latent solution in , we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Algorithm 1 achieves a pseudo-approximation ratio of for the -edges disruptor problem. Time Complexity: Construction of the decomposition tree takes . The major portion of time is for solving a semidefinite programming with constraints. Finding the optimal solution using Dynamic Programming takes . Hence, the overall time complexity is .
IV. -VERTEX DISRUPTOR
We present a polynomial-time algorithm (Algorithm 3) that finds a -vertex disruptor in the directed graph whose the size is at most times the optimal -vertex disruptor where . The algorithm involves in two phases. In the first phase, we split each vertex into two vertices and while putting an edge from to and show that removing in has the same effects as removing edge in the new graph. In the second phase, we try to decompose the new graph into SCCs capping the sizes of the largest component while minimizing the number of removed edges. We relax the constraints on the size of each component until the set of cut edges induces a -vertex disruptor in the original graph . Given a directed graph for which we want to find a small -vertex disruptor, we split each vertex in into two new vertices to obtain a new directed graph , where
The new graph will have twice the number of vertices in , i.e.,
. An example for the first phase is shown in Fig. 4 .
We set the costs of all edges in to 1, and other edges in to , so that only edges in can be selected in an edge disruptor set. In implementation, it is safe to set the costs of edges not in to , noting that by paying a cost of we can effectively disconnect all edges in . Consider a directed edge disruptor set that contains only edge in . We have a one-to-one correspondence between to a set in , which is a vertex disruptor set in . Since and have different maximum pairwise connectivity, for and for , the fractions of pairwise connectivity remaining in and after removing and are, however, not exactly equal to each other.
In the second phase of Algorithm 3, when separating a graph into SCCs, the smaller the sizes of SCCs, the smaller pairwise connectivity in the graph. However, the smaller the maximum size of each SCC, the more edges to be cut. We perform binary search to find a right upper bound for size of each SCC in . In the algorithm, the lower bound and upper bound of the size of each SCC are denoted by and , respectively. At each step, we try to find a minimum capacity edge set in whose removal partitions the graph into strongly connected components of size at most , where . We round the value of to the nearest multiple of so that the number of steps for the binary search is bounded by . The problem of finding a minimum capacity edge set to decompose a graph of size into strongly connected components of size at most is known as the -separator problem. We use here the algorithm presented in [23] that a fixed finds a -separator in directed graph whose value is at most times , where is the cost of the optimal -separator. Finally, we derive the cut vertices in from the cut edges in to obtain the -vertex disruptor. Lemma 2: Algorithm 3 always terminates with a -vertex disruptor.
Proof: We show that whenever , then the corresponding found in Algorithm 3 is a -vertex disruptor in . Consider the edge disruptor in induced by . We first show the mapping between SCCs in and SCCs in , the graph obtained by removing from . Partition the vertex set of into: 1)
: the set of removed nodes; 2)
: the set of nodes that are not in any cycle, i.e., they are SCCs of size one; 3)
: union of remaining SCCs that sizes are at least two, say
. This guarantees that the binary search always finds a -vertex disruptor and completes the proof. Theorem 5: Algorithm 3 always finds a -vertex disruptor whose size is at most times the optimal -vertex disruptor for . Proof: It follows from the Lemma 2 that Algorithm 3 terminates with a -vertex disruptor . At some step, the capacity of equals the capacity of -separator in , where is at least according to Lemma 2 and the binary search scheme. The cost of the separator is at most times the using the algorithm in [23] . Consider an optimal -vertex disruptor of and its corresponding edge disruptor in . Denote the cost of that optimal vertex disruptor by . [23] . Hence, the total time complexity is . However, in our experiments, the algorithm takes much less than its worst-case running time.
A. Approximating Edge Disruptor Is at Least as Hard as Approximating Vertex Disruptor
We show that an approximation algorithm for general directed edge disruptor yields an approximation algorithm for directed vertex disruptor with (almost) the same approximation ratio.
Lemma 3: A -edge disruptor set in the directed graph induces the same cost -vertex disruptor set in .
Proof: We use and for vertex disruptor in and edge disruptor in .
Given we need to prove that , where . Assume has SCCs of size at least 2, say . The corresponding SCCs in will be , where .
Since for all .
We have .
Lemma 4:
A -vertex disruptor set in induces the same cost -edge disruptor set in for any . Proof: We use the same notations in the proof of Lemma 3. Given , we need to prove that . We have (2) when . Theorem 6: Given a factor polynomial-time approximation algorithm for -edge disruptor, there exists a factor polynomial-time approximation algorithm for -vertex disruptor where is an arbitrary small constant. Proof: Let be a directed graph with uniform vertex costs in which we wish to find a -vertex disruptor. Construct as described at the beginning of this section.
Apply the given approximation algorithm to find in a -edge disruptor, denoted by , with the cost at most -, where -is the cost of a (2) in Lemma 4, the pairwise connectivity after removing vertices will be less than Therefore, after removing at most vertices from , we get a -edge disruptor. Hence --
V. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In this section, we discuss a set of experiments designed to gain insight into the performance of the pseudo-approximation in different settings. In the first set of experiments, we compare the performance of the pseudo-approximation algorithm (Algorithm 3) to the performance of an optimal solution obtained by solving an integer programming formulation of the problem. To this end, we generate two types of networks: random networks, based on Erdos-Rényi model, and power-law networks, based on Barabási-Albert model. For each type of network, we generate different instances of networks, with a number of nodes ranging from 30 to 100. The edge densities of the generated networks are around 10%. The experiments were carried out on an 8-core, 2.2 GHz machine and 64 GB memory.
The size of the disruptors found by Algorithm 3 and the optimal disruptors, respectively, are presented in Tables I and II. The results clearly show that the pseudo-approximation algorithm produces near-optimal solutions in all cases, with an optimal solution in more than 50% of the cases, shown in boldface in the table.
In particular, the results show that our algorithm performs extremely well on power-law networks. It misses the optimal solution in only one case, when the number of vertices is 90. The results also show that, for a random network and a power-law network of roughly the same size, the size of disruptor in the power-law network is significantly smaller (approximately 50%) than that in the random network, thereby indicating an extremely high degree of power-law network vulnerability to attacks [24] . The running time for solving the integer programming increases from a few minutes to 10 h for the largest test cases, while in the longest run, the pseudo-approximation algorithm takes only 29 s.
In the second set of experiments, we study a network of 4941 nodes and 6594 edges representing the topology of the Western States Power Grid of the US. The network exhibits high clustering with small path lengths, indicating a high vulnerability to attacks [25] . Finding an optimal disruptor for such a large network, using integer programming, is clearly intractable. To overcome this shortcoming, an approximation algorithm, which uses a row-generation technique to reduce excessive amount of constraints, was developed. Using this algorithm, the experiments were run on a clusters of 20 nodes, where each node is equipped with an 8-core, 2.2 GHz, and 64-GB memory.
In this study, we compare the performance of the node-centrality-based schemes to the performance of the proposed pseudo-approximation algorithm. Of particular focus is the ability of the scheme to accurately assess the network vulnerability in term of overall network connectivity. The methods used in this comparative study include the following. 1) Degree centrality: The algorithm sequentially removes the node with the maximum degree until the pairwise connectivity in the graph becomes less than . 2) Betweenness centrality: The algorithm repeatedly removes the node with the maximum betweenness centrality, until the pairwise connectivity in the graph becomes less than . Recall that the betweenness, , for node is expressed as , where is the number of shortest paths from to , and is the number of shortest paths from to that pass through a node .
3) Eigenvector centrality: In this algorithm, nodes are removed in descending order of their eigenvector centrality values, using a default damping factor of 0.85 [26] . The results show that the network is surprisingly vulnerable to targeted attacks. For example, reducing network connectivity by 40% only requires the destruction of 0.16% of the stations. Reducing connectivity in random and power-law networks by the same level, however, requires, on average, the destruction of 13% and 3% of the network nodes, respectively. The results also show that the destruction of only 1% of stations dramatically disrupts network operations and reduces the power grid by 90%.
With regard to assessing overall network vulnerability, the results show that node-centrality-based methods perform poorly. None of these methods is able to correctly evaluate the vulnerability of the power grid. Their disruptor sizes are 6 to 20 times larger than the corresponding ones produced by the pseudo-approximation algorithm. This clearly limits their usage in assessing the vulnerability of large-scale, critical infrastructure such as the power grid. It is also worth noting that, because of high clustering property, nodes that lie within clusters in the network, often have high betweenness values. Intuitively, it is therefore expected that the Betweenness Centrality method would easily identify those nodes as high-risk nodes. Surprisingly, the performance of this method was worse than that of the Degree Centrality method.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel framework, based on network pairwise connectivity, to assess network vulnerability is proposed. The framework provides the basis to investigate network vulnerability as an optimization problem, referred to as the -disruptor, whose objective is to determine the minimum number of network elements-nodes and vertices-that must be removed to reduce the network pairwise connectivity to a specific level. We present hardness results related to this problem, including the NP-completeness and inapproximability, along with two pseudo-approximation algorithms with provable performance bounds. The accuracy of our framework compared to existing measurements are validated through a series of experiments of both simulated and real networks. The results show that -disruptor framework exhibits higher accuracy in assessing network vulnerability than schemes based on node centrality metrics.
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